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CHARGES ON PRESUMPTIONS AND BURDEN
OF PROOF
CHARLES T. McCORMICK*
Presumptions' come into play chiefly at two stages in a trial,
first, when a motion for a non-suit or for a directed verdict is presented, or, second, when the judge is called on to frame instructions
to govern the jury in its consideration of the evidence.
I
With respect to the first occasion, the situation is, in theory,
relatively simple. Let us suppose a vital issue in a trial is: was
John Smith alive at the time the action was commenced? It is possible that at the end of the trial no evidence may have been introduced at all bearing upon this question. In that event, the judge,
if requested, will obviously find or direct a finding against one of
the parties upon that issue. The form of the finding may be an order
of non-suit, a direction to the jury to answer a question in a certain
way, or a direction of a verdict generally, against one party-according as the issue is involved in the claim or the defense. The party
against whom this ruling has been made had the first duty to offer
evidence, i. e., to "proceed," "to go forward," on the issue. He has
not done so, and the duty is enforced by the penalty of an adverse
peremptory ruling. This first duty of proceeding with evidence on
an issue merely means the liability to an adverse ruling if when the
case ends evidence on the issue is not produced.
Let us suppose that the plaintiff in the particular case is conscious
that this first duty of offering evidence that John Smith was alive
when action brought rests on him, the plaintiff. He seeks to fulfill
this duty. To do this he may offer direct evidence, e.g., of witness
Jones, that he saw Smith alive in the clerk's office while the writ in
the action was being issued. From this the inference of the truth
of the fact to be proved depends only upon the truthfulness of Jones.
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
'The views presented in this article are not new, in the main. The writer's
debt to such works as J. B. Thayer's Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, J. H.
Wigmore's Evidence (2nd Ed.), C. F. Chamberlayne's The Modern Law of
Evidence, and to suggestions derived from E. W. Hinton's Cases on the Law
of Evidence, and John M. Maguire's edition of Thayer's Cases on Evidence, is
very deep. This paper largely restates their conclusions with special emphasis

upon their effect upon the form of the instructions to the jury.
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Or, he may offer circumstantialevidence, which requires a weighing
of probabilities as to matters other than merely the truthfulness of
the witness. For example, he may secure the testimony of Jones
to the effect that he, Jones, received a letter in the mail which was
signed "John Smith" one month before the action was brought.
Patently in this latter case, the tribunal may be satisfied that Jones
is speaking the truth, and yet the tribunal may decline to infer the
fact of Smith's being alive when the action began.
How strongly persuasive must the offered evidence be to satisfy
the duty? Obviously it must be such that a reasonable man could
draw from it the inference of the existence of the particular fact to
be proved. In case of direct evidence no difficulty occurs. It is
sufficient, though given by one witness only, however negligible a
human being he may be. But if the evidence bo circumstantial,
forensic disputes as to its sufficiency to warrant a jury to draw the
desired inference often arise. Ordinarily the judge when called
upon to rule on this question 2 must do so in the light merely of his
own common sense and experience of human affairs. In the last
analysis his ruling then rests on his individual opinion as to the
limits of reasonable inference from the facts proven. However,
certain situations constantly recur and give rise repeatedly to litigation, and a given judge, in his desire for consistency and the consequent saving of time and mental travail, will rule alike whenever the
same situation is proved and its sufficiency to warrant a certain inference is questioned. Other judges follow suit and a standardized
practice, ripening into a rule of procedure, results. Most of these
rules are positive rather than negative. They announce that certain
types of fact-groups are sufficient to enable the person who has the
first duty to go forward with evidence to fulfill that duty, i.e., they
enable him to rest after proving them without being subject to the
penalty of an adverse ruling. Examples of such enabling factgroups, as given in a recent North Carolina decision, are: delivery
of goods to a carrier in good condition and delivery by the carrier
in a damaged state, to show negligence; injury to neighboring prop'The test of sufficiency of circumstantial evidence is thus announced by
Wigxnore (Evidence, sec. 2494): "Are there facts in evidence which if unanswered would juitify men of ordinary reason and fairness in affirming the
question which the plaintiff is bound to maintain?" This is approved in Lawrence v. Yadkin River Power Co. (1925) 190 N. C. 664, 130 S. E. 735, 738,
holding evidence as to origin of a field-fire sufficient to warrant inference
that it was due to defendant's negligent maintenance of its power-line and
right of way.
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erty by fire set from passing locomotives, also to show negligence;
and injury to passengers in a wreck or derailment, likewise to show
3
negligence.
Suppose the one who had the initial duty of offering evidence in
support of the alleged fact, on pain of an adverse ruling, does produce evidence barely sufficient to satisfy that duty, so that the judge
can just say, "A reasonable jury could infer that the fact is as
alleged, from the circumstances proved." If the proponent then
rests what is the situation? Has the duty of going forward shifted
to the adversary? Not if we define that duty (as we did before)
as the liability to a peremptory adverse ruling on failing to give
evidence, for if at this juncture the original proponent rests and the
adversary offers no proof, the proponent will not be entitled to the
direction of a verdict in his favor on the issue, but rather the court
will leave the issue to the decision of the jury. But it is frequently
said that in this situation the duty of going forward has shifted to
the adversary 4 and this is unobjectionable if we bear in mind that the
penalty for silence is very different here from that which was applied to the original proponent. If he had remained silent at the
outset he would have irrevocably lost the case on this issue, but the
only penalty now applied to his adversary is the risk, if he remains
silent, of the jury's finding against him, though it nuay find for him.
Theoretically he may have this risk still, even after he has offered
evidence in rebuttal. It might be simpler to limit "duty of going
forward" to the liability, on resting, to an adverse ruling, and to
regard the stage just discussed (where the situation is that if both
parties rest, the issue will be left to the jury) as one in which
neither party has any duty of going forward.
In the situation just discussed the party who first had the duty,
i.e., the necessity, of giving proof, has produced evidence which
requires the judge to permit the jury to infer, as it chooses, that the
fact alleged is or is not true. It is a permitted, but not a compulsory,
inference. Is it possible for the original proponent of evidence to
carry his proof to the stage where if he rests, he will be entitled to a
directed verdict, or its equivalent, on the issue? Undoubtedly, with
' See Austin v. Seaboard Air Line R. Co. (1923) 187 N. C. 7, 121 S. E. 1,
3. No doubt some of these examples would be treated by some courts as
cases of mandatory presumptions and not mere permissible inferences.
' For example, see Hunt v. Eure (1925) 189 N. C. 482, 127 S. E. 593, especially p. 597 (presumption of consideration from recital of value in nonnegotiable note) ; and Austin v. Ry. Co., supra, note 3.

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

a qualification to be noted, this is possible, and when it occurs there
is a shifting to the adversary of the duty of going forward with the
evidence, in the strictest sense. Such a ruling means that in the
judge's view the proponent has not merely offered evidence from
which reasonable men could draw the inference of the truth of the
fact alleged, but evidence from which (in the absence of evidence
from the adversary) reasonable men could not help but draw this
inference. Thus, Lord Mansfield, in Rex v. Almon,5 told the jury
that upon the issue of whether defendant had published a libel,
proof of a sale of the book in defendant's shop was, being unrebutted, "conclusive," and Nash, J., in State v. Floyd O said: "Prima
facie evidence is a rebuttable presumption of law, and if not rebutted, the jury is bound in law to find their verdict in accordance
with it, and if they refuse to do so, they violate their duty." Thus,
in the case first supposed, if the plantiff brought forward the direct
evidence of Jones that Smith was alive when the writ was issued,
and there is no contrary evidence at all, or where he brings forward
circumstantial evidence (that is, evidence that Smith was seen alive
in perfect health ten minutes before the writ was issued) which is, in
the absence of contrary circumstances, irresistibly convincing, the
jury should no more be left to refuse at will to draw the only rational inference, than they should be permitted to draw an inference
from insufficient data, where the proponent has failed to sustain his
initial duty of producing evidence enough to support the inference
desired. Here again the ruling, from repeated occurrence of similar
facts, may become a standardized one. The statement that one who
has the duty of going forward can go forward far enough not
merely to escape an adverse peremptory ruling himself, but to subject his opponent to one if the latter declines to take up the gage
by producing evidence, has however, the following qualification.
Obviously if the testimony were conflicting as to the truth of the
facts from which the inference of the fact in issue is desired to be
drawn, and the judge believes the inference (conceding the truth
of the premise) is irresistible to rational minds, he can only make a
conditional peremptory ruling. He directs the jury, if you believe
the evidence that fact A is so then you must find fact B, the fact
in issue. And in some jurisdictions, including North Carolina, if
the party seeking the ruling has the ultimate burden of persuasion
'5 Burr. 2686 (K. B. 1770).

$35 N. C. 382, 386.
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on the issue, meaning usually the party who has pleaded the fact.
he can only get such a conditional ruling, though his witnesses are
undisputed and unimpeached. 7 But, in either event, if the inference
is overwhelming, the judge does not permit the jury to cogitate over
that, but only over the truthfulness of those who testify to the basic
data.
We have seen something of the mechanics of the process of
"proceeding" or "going forward" with evidence, viewed from the
point of view of the first party who is stimulated to produce proof
under threat of a ruling foreclosing a finding in his favor. He may
pass in the process through three stages of judicial hospitality (a)
where if he stops he will be thrown (qua this issue) out of court
(b) where if he stops and his adversary does nothing, his reception
will be left to the jury, and (c) where if he stops and his adversary
does nothing, his victory (so far as it depends on having the circumstantial inference he desires drawn) is at once proclaimed. Obviously, whenever the first producer of proof stops, the adversary
may go forward with evidence in turn, and he again may in his
turn pass through the same three stages. His evidence again may
be (a) insufficient to warrant a finding in his favor, (b) sufficient
to warrant to finding, or (c) irresistible, if unrebutted.
II.
What is the effect of a "presumption" upon this process of whipping up the respective parties to produce evidence, this "duty" which
shifts from one side to the other like a tennis ball in play? One
ventures the assertion that "presumption" is the slipperiest member
of the family of legal terms, except its first cousin, "burden of proof,"
of whom more anon. Agreement can be secured to this extent, however: a presumption is a standardised practice, under which certain
oft-recurring fact groupings are held to call for uniform treatment
whenever they occur, with respect to their effect as proof to support
issues. Admittedly, as we have seen, proof of one class of typesituation (e.g., delivery of a shipment in good condition to a carrier,
and its delivery by the carrier at destination in a damaged state) may
by a rule of practice, be recognized as calling for a ruling that the

' Giles v. Giles (1910) 204 Mass. 383, 90 N. E. 595; Anniston Nat. Bank v.
School Committee of Durham (1897) 121 N. C. 107, 28 S. E. 134 (construing
C. S. 564). In a majority of jurisdictions no such restriction exists, except as
to instructions against the defendant in criminal cases. 5 Wigmore, Evidence
(2nd Ed.) sec. 2495; 38 Cyc. 1574, 1575.
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producer of the proof has gone forward far enough to "get to the
jury" on the inference (damage by acts of the carrier) which is
desired. Every judge in every case should so rule, and he is relieved
of the usual necessity of critically considering the rational permissibility of the inference. But we have also seen that in another class
of fact-groupings (e.g., the facts of the mailing of a letter properly
stamped and addressed offered to show receipt by the addressed) the
standardized practice to be automatically applied by the judge is to
rule that the proof of the particular recognized group of facts is conclusive, that is, the inference is not to be weighed by judge or jury,
but if the circumstantial facts are undisputed, or if disputed are
found to be true, the conclusion follows as a matter of law provided
no counter-proof is offered.8 Does a "presumption" give its beneficiary the right to the first of these rulings, the permission to the jury
to infer, or to the second, the compulsion to find (in the absence of
contrary proof) without weighing the inference? Very few of the
decisions discuss this distinction, because very seldom does the adversary fail to produce some counter-proof so that the effect of the stark
fact-groups, standing alone, seldom comes in issue. Thayer,9 Wigmore,10 and Chamberlayne,11 the great triumvirate of law-writers on
Evidence, unite in attributing to the "presumption" the (provisionally) compulsory effect. Many judicial definitions are in accord.12
'Bragaw vi. Supreme Lodge (1899) 124 N. C. 154, 32 S. E. 544 (presumption of receipt of letter duly mailed; the conflicting evidence raised a doubt
only as to whether it was actually mailed. Held: a charge which left to the
jury whether it was received was error; only the question whether it was
mailed was for their consideration); cf. Standard Trust Co. v. Bank (1914)
166 N. C. 112, 81 S. E. 1074.
'Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, pp. 317, 321, 326.
Evidence, sec. 2490.
The Modern Law of Evidence, secs. 1085 and 1087.

'Walker, J., in Cogdell v. R.R. (1903) 132 N. C. 852, 44 S. E. 618: "The

Court was requested to charge that there was a presumption that the deceased
had exercised care, which the Court refused to give, but charged the jury
that there was an inference that due care was exercised. The presumption
has a technical force or weight, and the jury, in the absence of sufficient
proof to overcome it, should find according to the presumption; but, in the
case of a mere inference, there is no technical force attached to it. The jury,
in the case of an inference, are at liberty to find the ultimate fact one way or
the other as they may be impressed by the testimony. In the one case the
law draws a conclusion from the state of the pleadings and evidence, and in
the other case the jury draw it. An inference is nothing more than a permissible deduction from the evidence, while a presumption is compulsory and

cannot be disregarded by the jury." Quoted 5 Wigmore, Evidence (2nd
Ed.), p. 450. In re Bauer's Estate (1869) 79 Cal. 304, 307, 21 Pac. 759, 760:
"A presumption (unless declared by law to be conclusive) may be contro-

verted by other evidence, but unless so controverted, the jury are bound to
find according to the presumption."
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On the other hand, many decisions which hold merely that the group
of facts considered was sufficient to warrant the desired inference, describe the result as a "presumption." In this latter sense a presumption is the same as a "prima facie case." 13 Probably the best practical
treatment of the problem of nomenclature is to recognize the word
"presumption" as a collective term embracing both varieties of procedural rules, but to distinguish the two as permissive presumptions,
and mandatory presumptions. 1 4 The recognition of permissive presumptions as true presumptions is a departure from the language of
the text-books, but accords with actual judicial usage.
Thus far, we have been considering presumptions solely as they
affect the problem which arises when the judge is asked to give a
binding instruction, or decisive ruling, such as a compulsory non-suit,
on the ground that an inference of a fact in issue desired by one of
the parties is insufficiently supported by, or insufficiently opposed by,
the evidence. The power of the evidence, adduced by the one side or
the other, to elicit a favorable, or to avoid an unfavorable, ruling of
this sort, is "the weight of the evidence," and it casts "the duty of
going forward" upon one party or his opponent accordingly.

III.
It is sometimes asserted that presumptions have no efficacy except
to elicit or avoid these peremptory rulings, and that if the evidence
in its shifting course comes to an end at a stage where the conflicting
inferences are for the jury that any presumptions which may have
been available during the trial are now like spent balls, or, in the
witty and oft-quoted phrase of a Missouri lawyer, like "bats of the
law flitting in the twilight, but disappearing in the sunshine of actual
facts."1 5 In this view presumptions are simply rules directing the
" White v. Hines (1921) 182 N. C. 275, 109 S. E. 31, 38: "In some of our
decisions the expressions res ipsa loquitur, prima facie evidence, prima facie
case, and presumption of negligence have been used as practically synonymous.
As thus used, each expression signifies nothing more than evidence to be
considered by the jury." Hunt v. Eure (1925) 189 N. C. 482, 127 S. E. 593,
597: "A presumption of negligence, when establishing a prima facie case, is
still only evidence of negligence for the consideration of the jury, and the
burden of the issue remains on the plaintiff."
",Permissive and mandatory, that is, as respects its effect on the jury.

" Lamm, J., in Mockowik v. Ry. Co. (1906) 196 Mo. 550, 94 S. W. 256,

262, quoted in 5 Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 2491; compare Faris, J., dissenting,
in Reynolds v. Casualty Co. (1918) 274 Mo. 83, 201 S. W. 1128: "The moment explanatory evidence comes into the case the presumption dissolves into
thin air and becomes as wholly non-existent as though it never had had existence." Quoted in 23 Mo. Law Bulletin, 43.
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judge when to drop, or refuse to drop, the final curtain on the drama
of the jury trial, 16 and they are nothing more. They would thus not
need to be mentioned in the court's charge at all. Admittedly
they do serve the purpose just described, but it is believed that they
also have further functions in the trial's second stage mentioned in the
opening sentence of this article, the stage of instructing the jury in
how they shall arive at their conclusions when it becomes their duty
to decide between conflicting inferences.
May the judge in leaving fact-questions to the jury in his charge
inform them of presumptions arising from the evidence, and under
what circumstances may this be done?
One occasion for doing so has already been mentioned, and that
is when the evidence raises a presumption of the mandatory type,
but the adversary, instead of seeking to evade the inference by showing circumstances leading to a different conclusion, offers evidence
denying the premises. Thus, in a jurisdiction where seven years'
disappearance without news creates a mandatory presumption of
death, upon proof of disappearance seven years before trial and no
subsequent tidings, the adversary might offer evidence only that the
first witnesses are mistaken, and that the person left home only six
years ago. In such event, the judge should direct the jury that if
they find seven years' disappearance without tidings, they must find
the person to be dead. 17 Even if the testimony of seven years' disappearance were undisputed, these jurisdictions which refuse to give
directed verdicts, assuming the truth of undisputed evidence, for
parties having the burden of persuasion, could give only such a conditional direction, and everywhere this would be the most that could
be done if the prosecution were seeking the benefit of such a preOn the other hand, if the evidence
sumption in a criminal case.'
creating such a mandatory presumption were countered by the adversary by proving fresh circumstances of an opposite trend, as where
the adversary, instead of denying the seven years absence without
news, showed that the disappearance was preceded by circumstances
indicating an urgent necessity for the person's vanishing awxay mysteriously and continuing to "lie low" (such as a serious quarrel or an
"Swoboda v. Nowak (1923) 213 Mo. App. 452, 255 S. W. 1079; McCune
v. Daniels (1923, Mo. App.) 251 S. W. 458; Railway v. Wise (1917) 186 Ind.
316, 116 N. E. 299.
H. Lane, Presumptions, 22 Michigan Law Review, 207, 213.
Victor
See note 7, supra
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indictment), 19 then the inference of death vel non being thrown
open, a direction to find death if they find seven years absence without news would be wrong.
Which brings us to a second problem as to how far the judge's
charge shall inform the jury of presumptions. If the presumption
be, as assumed in the example just given of seven years' disappearance, one originally mandatory, but with its mandatory sting removed
by the proof of opposing circumstances by the adversary, throwing
the door wide for inferences pro and con to be drawn by the jury, or
if it be merely a permissive one which simply authorizesthe jury from
the circumstances shown, to make the finding desired, should the
judge apprise the jury of the presumption in his charge?
This is a difficult and important question, of which there is little
discussion in the decisions (so far as I have read them) which
pierces through the particular problem to considerations of general
application. In the first place, can we settle the question at once by
banishing all such mention of presumptions from the charge, as a
forbidden 20 comment on the weight of evidence? This is Chamberlayne's view. 2 1

There are supporting expressions in the decisions,

but it is believed that the prevailing view is that merely advising the
jury of the existence of the presumption as a rule which warrantsor
authorizes them to find in accord with it, does not violate the
statute.22 Certainly the practice of apprising the jury of presumptions is followed constantly in many states.23 Moreover, it seems
"Insurance Co. v. Martin (1900) 108 Ky. 11, 55 S. W. 694; Thetford v.
Modern Woodmen (1925 Tex. Civ. App.) 273 S. W. 666, 671.
' Under the rule obtaining in most states but not in England nor in the
Federal Courts.
2 Modern Law of Evidence, sec. 1085.
' Compare Austin v. Seaboard Air Line (1923) 187 N. C. 7, 121 S. E. 1, 3,
where Hoke, J., said: "And in cases of the kind suggested on an issue of
negligence of defendant, the burden of the issue is upon the plaintiff; but
where it appears that goods have been shipped with a common carrier in good
condition and have been lost or delivered in an injured condition, or where
claimant's property has been, destroyed or injured by fire communicated from
defendant's engine or train, or where one a passenger or employee has been
killed or injured by a collision or derailment of trains, and these basic facts
are established by the greater weight of the evidence, a proper charge would
be that they constitute or pretent a prima facie case, carrying the burden of
liability to the jury on the issue and without more justifying the inference
of negligence if the jury so find."
Examples of such charges are seen in the following cases: Pooler v.
Snith (1905) 73 S. C. 102, 52 S. E. 967, presumption of legitimacy; Patterson v. Campbell (1911) 136 Ga. 664, 71 S. E. 1117. presumption of payment
from lapse of time; McMahon v. Flynn (1923) 154 Minn. 326, 191 N. W.
902, presumption of due care of victim of fatal accident. And see Branson,
Instructions to Juries, Index, title "Presumptions."
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not to offend the intention of the "comment" statutes for they are
designed to prevent the particular judge's individual view of the
fact-inferences to be drawn from the testimony from being known
to the jury. This objection does not apply to the expression by the
judge of presumptions which are legal rules to be announced in all
similar cases, assessing the sufficiency of certain standard fact-groups
as evidence of certain conclusions. A frequent error is the statement in the charge that from certain facts a certain presumption
arises, when in truth no such presumption, i.e., standardized, regularized inference, is recognized for the particular fact-group by the
courts of that jurisdiction. The so-called presumption is likely to
be nothing more than an allowable inference from the particular
facts selected by the judge, and his direction of the jury's attention
to them and the possible inferences from them is regarded as an
expression of the individual judge's opinion on the weight of the
evidence, and hence as error.2 4 This is an error very difficult for a
2' These non-standardized fact-inferences were called in an older and now
largely abandoned terminology, "presumptions of fact," as' distinguished from
"presumptions of law," i.e., true presumptions. See Jones, Evidence (Civil
Cases), 3rd Ed., sec. 10, and Lockhart, Handbook of Evidence for North
Carolino, sec. 228, approved in Austin v. Ry. Co. (1923) 187 N. C. 7, 121 S. E.
1, 3. Presumptions proper were to be enforced by the charge, but the bastard
presumptions "of fact," or mere allowable inferences, were not to be mentioned in the instructions. People v. Carrillo (1879) 54 Calif. 63 (instruction
that failure by tax collector to pay over money collected raised a presumption of
felonious appropriation, unwarranted) ; Herkelrath v. Stookey (1872) 63 II1.
486: "In that instruction the jury are told, 'if the mortgage was made by a
father to two of his sons, in the night time, under suspicious circumstances
and at the same time the father transferred to said sons all his land and
personal property, and the property in the chattel mortgage was subject to be
consumed or destroyed in its use by the mortgagor, these are circumstances
from which the jury may infer that the transaction was a fraudulent one.'
• Another and fatal objection is, that while the circumstances named in
the instruction may be suspicious, they do not raise a legal presumption of
fraud. They are to be considered in connection with all the other evidence,
and it is for the jury to determine, from the entire evidence, what inference
is to be drawn, without being instructed by the court as to what weight they
are to attach to any particular portion of it. When the court says that a
certain inference may be drawn from certain facts, if proven, most juries
would understand the instruction as meaning that it was their duty to draw
such inference. The instruction would, at least, indicate that the court thought
it highly proper the inference should be drawn. There are cases in which
such an instruction would not be improper, but under our system of practice in
this state, the court should not so instruct, except in cases where the alleged
circumstances are of such a character that the law itself raises the presumption. Where one party proves certain facts which the other attempts to explain or overcome by the proof of certain other facts, the jury should be left
to draw their own inferences, without any intimation from the court as to
what it would be proper to infer from the evidence of either side"; Life Ins.
Co. v. Buchanan (1884) 100 Ind. 63, 81; Mitchell v. Stanton (1911 Tex. Civ.
App.) 139 S. W. 1033, 1036; Stooksbury v. Swan (1893) 85 Tex. 563, 22 S. W.
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trial judge to avoid, for it is often nearly impossible to determine
when the allowable fact-inference has crystallized into a judicially
accepted permissive presumption. A group of facts may be treated
in one state as merely the basis for a fact-inference, in another as
creating a permissive presumption or prima facie case, and in still
another as a full-fledged mandatory presumption.
Another example of such erroneous enunciation of the effect of
presumptions is furnished by a form of charge once common but
now generally disapproved. The charge referred to is that which
not only instructs the jury of the existence of the presumption, but
informs them that it is "evidence" and that it is to be weighed along
with the other evidence, or equivalent language. The following passage from an early case sufficiently exposes the error in such instructions:
"A legal presumption is a rule of law-a reasonable principle,
or an arbitrary dogma-declared by the court. There may be a
difficulty in weighing such a rule of law as evidence of a fact, or in
weighing law on one side, against fact on the other. And if the
weight of a rule of law as evidence of a fact, or as counterbalancing
the evidence of a fact, can be comprehended, there are objections to
such a use of it. In this case, on the question of emancipation, if the
scales holding all the evidence on both sides were even, did the presumption when added to the defendant's side incline them in his
favor? If it did, it had no effect on the case, because it was not
necessary for the defendant to produce a preponderance of the evidence; if it did not, the jury were instructed to weigh as evidence,
that which had no weight. If the scales holding all the evidence on
both sides, preponderated in favor of the plaintiff, did the presumption, when added to the defendant's side, restore the equilibrium?
If it did, the plaintiff was required to produce something more than
963, 966, 967, charge that acts of public officers are presumed to be regular,
held an improper comment. The opinion has an unusually extended and
pertinent discussion of the limits of the judge's power to charge on presumptions: "It has been frequently held in this state that a. charge which, in
effect, informed the jury that the law presumes the existence of some fact
from the existence of others, is a charge upon the weight of evidence, and
therefore improper, unless it be in those cases in which the presumption is
said to be one of law, and therefore conclusive, or one of fact, required by positive law, but rebuttable"; White v. McCullough (1909) 56 Tex. Civ. App. 383,
120 S. W. 1093, 1095; Branson, Instructions to Juries,2nd Ed., sec. 13.
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a preponderance of the evidence; if it did not, it was useless. A
25
legal presumption is not evidence."
But a question cuts deeper than these, and it is, is there any need
in the due administration of justice, for any mention of these permissive or rebutted presumptions in the court's charge ?26 Does the
jury derive from them, as a rule, any aid in reaching verdicts conformable to law and fact? If not, simplicity of administration would
demand that judge omit any mention of them, or at least that if he
did not choose to mention them (even though requested to do so)
this should not be ground for reversal. A statute, for example, says
that proof of possession of liquor shall create a presumption of
unlawful handling for gain. 27 The State proves the stark facts of
possession of liquor by the defendant. The defendant offers no evidence. Is it good administration to submit these facts to the jury,
with only the stock charge defining the offense of illegal handling for
gain, and placing the usual burden on the State of convincing the
jury of its case beyond a reasonable doubt? Such a charge would
often result in the mystification of the jurors. There is no evidence
'Doe, C. J., in Lisbon v. Lyman (1870) 49 N. H. 553, quoted by E. W.
Hinton in his Cases on Evidence, p. 79, note, where the learned editor adds

this comment: "It is impossible, however, to understand the mental process
involved in balancing or weighing a rule of law along with evidence. As
Lord Justice Bowen expressed it, in Abrat. v. Railway (1883) 11 Q. B. D.
440, when a jury is asked as to a plain question of fact, either they believe
it or do not believe it, or can not arrive at a conclusion. But the general
probability on which many presumptions are based might conceivably affect
the conclusion reached by the jury. For example, the general probability
that a person is more likely to be sane than otherwise, because the majority
of individuals are sane, does not appear to furnish much aid in the determination of the mental condition of X., as to whose behavior there is ample evidence. While it is true that the majority of individuals are sane, it is equally
true that the majority of sane individuals do not behave in certain unusual
ways. On the other hand the probability that the scattering of fire by a
locomotive is due to a bad condition or faulty construction may have considerable force as an argument in a given case, quite apart from any technical rule of presumption. When courts talk of weighing presumptions with
evidence, they doubtless mean that such probabilities may be considered, but
the expression is unfortunate, and apt -to mislead a jury."
' It is just at this fundamental question that the decisions fail us. They
discuss the correctness of particular instructions but not whether it would
have been better to give no instruction on presumptions at all. Perhaps the
assumption that presumptions should be charged may in some part be a survival from -the era when it was thought that they shifted the burden of persuasion, as to which an instruction was necessary.
" See Vol. 3 Cons. Stat. N. C. sec. 3411j: "The possession of liquor by any
person not legally permitted under this article to possess liquor shall be
prima facie evidence that such liquor is kept for the purpose of being sold,
bartered, exchanged, given away, furnished, or otherwise disposed of in violation of the provisions of this article." See also Vol. I Cons. Stat. N. C.
sec. 3379.
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which would be popularly regarded as "proof" of the defendant's
purpose in handling the liquor. They would be likely to feel that
probably the defendant had the liquor for sale, but that the State (of
whom they are adjured to demand unusual certainty of proof) had
not "proved" it. Some of them indeed might infer that the judge
would not have submitted the case to them at all, if they were not
legally warranted in finding against defendant, but experience shows
that this is not always understood. It certainly seems desirable,
then, that in such case, the judge should inform the jury of the
terms of the statute, so that they may know that the law does authorize them upon these scant facts to make an inference which, as a
pure matter of experiential reasoning, might be too conjectural.
In other cases, the data which create the presumption may be so
patently convincing of the existence of the issuable fact, that the connection would be apparent to the jury. Perhaps they would need,
for example, no judge's word to tell them that they would be at
liberty to infer from the mailing, properly stamped and addressed, of
a letter, that it was received by the addressee, though this were
disputed. 28 Evidence of possession immediately after the theft of
stolen property, unexplained, likewise points so persuasively to guilt
of the theft that probably the judge's explanation of its sufficiency
to convict29 would not ordinarily be needed by the jury. Certainly
it is superfluous to explain that a highwayman's pistol is presumed
to be loaded. 30 Presumptions, both permissive and mandatory, however, may be based on considerations of logic, experience, or probability, as we have seen, or they may be wholly or in part created to
subserve some other legal policy than that of merely ascertaining the
facts3 1 They may originate wholly or partly in considerations of
fairness in apportioning the production of evidence, with the view
of stimulating the party to whom the evidence is most familiar and
most accessible, to produce it. Such is the presumption of damage
by the last connecting carrier, where the presumption is supported by
'Compare Bragaw v. Supreme Lodge (1889) 124 N. C. 154, 32 S. E. 544,
where these facts are held to create a mandatory presumption.
Such an instruction was approved in Sahlinger v. People, 102 I1. 241, 244;
State v. Rowe (1923, S. C.) 115 S. E. 586; but in State v. Lippard (1922)
183 N. C. 786, 111 S. E. 722, the presumption is said to be one which is "to be
warily pressed." Other courts would deny the existence of such a presumption. Pearrow v. State (1920) 146 Ark. 182, 225 S. W. 311. See Chafee,
Progress of the Law, Evidence, 35 Harv. Law Rev. 302, 312, note 39.
" See State v. Parr (1909) 54 Ore. 316, 103 Pac. 434, 437.
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no inherent probability at all.3 ' The res ipsa loquitur cases are based
at least partly on this ground. A still broader social policy, however,
may dictate the presumption, as a means of handicapping an antisocial contention, without absolutely outlawing it, as in case of the
presumption that a child born in wedlock is legitimate, 2 the presumption that a woman, even of advanced years, is capable of bearing offspring, 33 or the statutory presumption that smoking opium
found in this country more than four years after the passage of the
Act, was unlawfully imported.3 4 In all these latter cases the presumption is of a technical or artificial cast, and if it is to be effectuated
the jury must be advised that the law authorizes a finding from the
grouped facts which, in following ordinary standards of probative
value, they might not feel at liberty to reach. In such cases the
jury does need an instruction informing them of the presumption.
But a great many presumptions, if not most, are rooted in a mixture
of the two soils, probability on the one hand, independent procedural
or social policy on the other. Thus the presumption of death from
seven years' disappearance, and of ownership from possession, are
prompted both from probability, and by the policy of settling estates.
Shall we require the trial judge to determine, at peril of reversal,
whether the particular presumption is so predominantly based on
common sense experience that the jury does not need to be told of it,
but indeed if told might be likely to give artificial weight to the
grouped facts, or whether on the other hand the presumption is a
rule of art which might enable the jury to find in a way which they
may desire, but may feel precluded from doing unless they are told
of it? The very statement of the proposition reveals its impracticability. If certainty be sought by reducing the matter to rule, should
the rule be that in case of conflicting inferences the presumption
shall never be charged? In most states this would be contrary to a
practice which would be hard to dislodge, 5 and would be undesirable
in the type of cases where the presumption is an "artificial" one as
above suggested. Shall we, then adopt the opposite extreme, that
" Chafee, op. cit., 35 Harv. Law Rev. 302, 311, 312.
"In re McNamara's Estate (1919) 181 Calif. 82, 183 Pac. 552. Presumption of Legitimacy of Child Born in Wedlock, 33 Harv. Law Rev. 306.
"Shuford v. Brady (1915) 169 N. C. 224, 85 S. E. 303.
' See Yee Hem v. United States (1925) 268 U. S. 178, 45 Sup. Ct. 470, upholding the act creating this presumption.
" See note 20, supra.
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it shall always be charged? - 6 This would open up a wide avenue
for reversals. The possibility remains of classifying each presumption, as one which should or should not be set out in the instructions.
That is fatally objectionable as too rigid a jacket upon the judge in
his control of the trial, and adding complexity to a mechanism already
too complex for ready administration. The obvious solution for this
(as for so many theoretically puzzling procedural problems) is to
recognize a discretion in the trial judge to include or to omit in his
instructions a statement of the presumption when an inference is to
be left to the jury's determination. His decision, based on his judgment as to whether the statement would or would not aid the jury as
indicated above, ought not to be reviewable unless in the rare case
in which the upper court is able to see distinctly that the omission or
inclusion of the statement in the instructions has contributed to a miscarriage of justice.
IV.
A rounded discussion of the treatment of presumptions in charges
can hardly omit reference to the much-debated question, does the presumption shift the "burden of proof"? We have seen at the outset
that the presumption clearly may operate to shift to the party against
whom it works, the necessity of producing evidence to "rebut" the
presumption, i.e., to avoid being "counted out" by a peremptory ruling of the judge, or to diminish the probability of an adverse jury
finding. This is a practical exigency which faces the advocate in
determining when to bring his proofs before the tribunal, but it is
not something which the jury need concern itself with. It has
faded into history when the case comes to be submitted to the jury.
But there is another exigency which may conceivably present
itself to the jury and which the courts are careful, perhaps overcareful, to provide against in advance. Let us suppose the sole issue
submitted is, Is X dead? If, as a result of the jury's deliberations,
all of the twelve are not agreed on the issue, there is a mistrial. But
suppose at the end of their deliberations all of the twelve are agreed
that they are in doubt as to whether X is dead or not? It is unsatisfactory to base a decision upon such mental state of suspended animation, but the law does so. It says that in such event the finding
"The oft-cited case of Cogdell v'. Ry., supra, note 11, might at first glance
be supposed to support the rule that a charge on the presumption must if requested always be given, but the court there was considering the case of a
mandatory presumption not faced by any rebutting evidence, and it is clear
that such a charge is necessary in that situation. See supra, note 16.
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must be entered against one of the contending parties. It says that
on every issue one of the parties has the burden of producing in the
jury's mind a state, not merely of negative doubt, but of positive
conviction in his favor. 37 This burden of persuasion3 8 is usually
determinable at the end of the pleadings, upon the basis that he who
pleads a fact (as distinguished from one who denies a previous allegation) has the burden of convincing the jury of its truth. In the
light of this analysis, made classic by Thayer and Wigmore, the procedural distinction between the duty of producing evidence at a given
juncture in the trial, and the subsequent risk of the jury's halting in
their deliberations at a state of doubt, is very clear. 89 Despite the
existence of the distinction, the connection of the two is very intimate.
The production of evidence produces the conviction. The same
word "proof" is popularly and properly used to describe both steps,
i.e., the offering of evidence, which convinces. Procedurally also,
both duties center at the outset in the same party, for usually he who
pleads a fact must first offer evidence to support his side of the
issue. If by the operation of a presumption it becomes necessary
for the adversary to offer "proof," it was easy to assume that this
"proof" meant convincing and not merely doubt-producing evidence.
Accordingly, and with no very disastrous results, courts, in stating
the effect of presumptions, habitually instructed juries that the presumption cast upon the adversary the "burden of proof," meaning to
40
include the burden of persuasion.
' The law requires a greater intensity of belief by the jury in criminal
cases, i.e., "beyond a reasonable doubt," than in civil cases where the usual
formula is belief "from a preponderance of the evidence." Wigmore, Eidence, secs. 2497, 2498. As to whether it is too stringent to direct the jury
in civil cases -that they must be "satisfied" from a preponderance of the evi-

dence, there is dispute. Moore v. Stone (1896 Tex. Civ. App.) 36 S. W. 909
disapproves, whereas Chaffin v. Mfg. and Power Co. (1904) 135 N. C. 95, 47
S. E. 226 and Pelitier v. R. Co. (1894) 88 Wis. 521, 60 N. W. 250 approve

such an instruction. In North Carolina a perhaps needless variation is introduced by prescribing that in criminal cases, though the defendant has the
burden of persuasion upon affirmative defenses such as insanity or self-defense, he need not prove the plea beyond a reasonable doubt, nor even by a
preponderance of evidence, but "simply to the satisfaction of the jury." State
v. Willis (1868) 63 N. C. 26; State v, Barrett (1903) 132 N. C. 1005, 43 S. E.

832; Hunt v. Eure (1925)

189 N. C. 482, 127 S. E. 593.

' This expression is suggested as simpler than Wigmore's phrase, "risk of
non-persuasion," and perhaps more definite than the term "burden of the
issue," often used in the North Carolina decisions.
'An especially lucid exposition of the distinction between the two burdens
is contained in the opinion of Stacy, C. J., in Speas v. Merchants Bank (1924)
188 N. C. 524, 125 S. E. 398.

"Examples of such decisions are Grant v. Raleigh & G. R. Co, (1891)

108 N. C. 462, 13 S. E. 209; Currie v. Ry. Co. (1911) 156 N. C. 419, 72 S. E.
489; Denny v. A. C. L. Ry. Co. (1920) 179 N. C. 529, 103 S. E. 24.
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The discovery of the long-overlooked double meaning of "burden
of proof" was a triumph of legal analysis. The analysts and those
who have followed their acute dissection have had so much intellectual pleasure in the process that they rather overlooked drab considerations of practical administration.
Conceding that a sharp
distinction exists between duty of going forward and burden of persuasion, and that a priori there is no necessity that the latter should
shift when the former does, there still remained the question: in a
jurisdiction where the practice was settled that judges should charge
that a presumption shifts both burdens, is there any inconvenience in
permitting such practice to continue?
Certainly the process of
changing the rule of practice was very inconvenient. 41 But in most
states the change was made, and it is now generally agreed that a
presumption does not as a rule shift the burden of persuasion, and
that ordinarily a charge which ascribes to a presumption the effect of
shifting the "burden of proof" is erroneous. 42 Doubtless, however,
it is still too sweeping to say that the burden of persuasion never
shifts. A few instances remain where on proof by the proponent of
certain facts, the adversary has cast upon him the burden of persua' Thus Calvert, 3., was reversed in Denny v. R. Co., supra, note 34, for
failing to charge that the burden was shifted, and- in Bertie Cotton Oil Co. v.
R. Co. (1922) 183 N. C. 95, 110 S. E. 660 he was reversed for shifting it!
'Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 2489; Kay v. Metropolitan St. R. Co. (1900)
163 N. Y. 447, 57 N. E. 751, presumption of negligence from escape of street
car from control; Railway Co. v. Myers (1924, Tex. Civ. App.) 264 S. W.
151. A long line of decisions has been necessary in North Carolina to establish this principle. A partial list follows: Winslow v. Hardware Co. (1908)
147 N. C. 275, 60 S. E. 1130, derailment of train, Clark, C. J., dissenting;
State v. Wilkerson (1913) 164 N. C. 431, 79 S. E. 888, presumption from
possession of liquor, Clark, C. 3., dissenting; McDowell v. Ry. Co. (1923) 186
N. C. 571, 120 S. E. 205, presumption of negligence from setting fire, Clark,
C. J., dissenting; Austin v. Ry. Co. (1923) 187 N. C. 7, 121 S. E. 1, similar
to last case, Clark, C. 3., dissenting; Ferrell v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. (1925) 190
N. C. 126, 129 S. E. 155, C. S. 3482 making killing of cattle prima facie evidence of negligence; McDanielv. Ry. Co. (1925) 190 N. C. 474, 130 S. E. 208,
prima facie case against carrier from evidence of shipment in good condition
and arrival in bad condition; Hunt v. Eure (1925) 189 N. C. 482, 127 S. E.
593, recital of value in non-negotiable note held to create prima facie evidence
of consideration, but error for trial court to charge that the defendants "must
show to the satisfaction of the jury, and not by the greater weight of the evidence" the absence of consideration; compare note 32, supra. This is a careful opinion by Varser, J., who suggests that "burden of proof" should be used
by trial judges only in the sense of "burden of issue," i.e., burden of persuasion. The same principle was clearly announced by Adams, J., in White v.
Hines (1921) 182 N. C. 275, 109 S. E. 31, but he construed the charge which
cast the "burden of proof" of absence of negligence on defendant in a derailment case as merely intended, in the light of its context, to shift the duty of
going forward, as to which compare a similar holding in Thetford v. Modern
Woodmen (1925, Tex. Civ. App.) 273 S. W. 666.

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

sion as to certain facts not pleaded by him. The classic instance is
the presumption of legitimacy from proof of birth during wedlock.
Here the adversary, to rebut, must not merely go forward with evidence, but must assume the burden of convincing the jury of illegitimacy. 48 And some courts ascribe this effect to proof of facts within
the res ispa loquitur range. 44 These are probably instances where
the presumption is regarded as shifting the burden of persuasion.
There are some other cases superficially similar, but probably falling
in a different class. Such are cases where a party is allowed by his
evidence to inject a wholly new issue into the case not suggested by
his pleading, which may be merely a denial. Thus a defendant in a
criminal case under a plea of "not guilty" may offer evidence of his
insanity and under a widely accepted view has the burden of persuading the jury of his insanity. There is sometimes said to be a presumption of sanity which casts the burden of persuasion on the
defendant. In truth, it is an affirmative defence which, exceptionally,
the defendant is allowed to raise by proof without having pleaded
it.45 Similarly, in actions by remote holders of negotiable instruments, where the defendant pleads a personal defense, such as fraud,
the plaintiff is not required to file a replication to the effect that his
purchase was for value and without notice. Nevertheless, by the
majority view, upon defendant's proof of fraud, the plaintiff must
the burden of
both go forward with evidence and ultimately carry
48
persuasion on the facts of value and want of notice.
It has been suggested above that the trial judge be given a wide
discretion to determine the advisability of charging on presumptions,
and that the security of the judgment below cannot be profitably
made to depend upon an appellate review of his discretion. So with
respect to the burden of persuasion, it is thought that reversals
because of inaccurate apportioning of that burden on various issues
by the trial judge ought to be much less frequent than they are.
The rules as to such apportionment are subtle and intricate and not
" See Bohlen, Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the Burden
of Proof, 68 Univ. Pa. Law Rev. 307, 319. See also a note on "Presumptions
of Legitimacy of a Child Born in Wedlock," 33 Harv. Law. Rev. 306.
"Weber v. Ry. Co. (1920) 175 Ia. 358, 151 N. W. 852, L. R. A. 1918A 626,
note; and an excellent note in 12 Calif. Law Rev. 138, 141, n. 9.
"Shepard v. W. U. Tel. Co. (1906) 143 N. C. 244, 55 S. E. 704 (dictum).
"Negotiable Instruments Law, sec. 59 (No. Car. C. S. 3040) ; Metropolitan

Discount Co. v. Baker (1918) 176 N. C. 546, 97 S.E. 495; Glendo S. Bank v.
Abbott (1923) 30 Wyo. 98, 216 Pac. 700, 34 A. L. R. 294; Negotiable Instr.
Law Annotated, Brannan, 4th Ed., pp. 521, 532.
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well adapted to application at nisi prius.47 With deference to the
judicial statements that the incidence of the burden of persuasion is a
matter of substantive and even of fundamental right, the writer begs
leave to doubt whether it is not a mere matter of procedure and one
of subordinate importance. In the absence of actual investigation,
the assertion may be reckless, but the writer's observation of jurors
leads him to believe that few of them ever give any weight in their
deliberation to the charge on burden of proof, except possibly where
absence of any other arguable contention leads some counsel to harp
on it unduly in his speech. Still fewer jurors, probably, could accurately explain what "burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence" really means. 49 "Preponderance of evidence" is a metaphor
which suggests quantity, and most jurors would so understand it,
whereas it means here merely evidence which actually convinces the
jury. 50 In view of these considerations, it is submitted that a misdirection as to the burden of persuasion should be assumed by the
upper court not to have influenced the verdict unless special reasons
appear in the particular case to believe that it did.
V.
The conclusions suggested may be reduced to the following:
(a) Presumptions are the result of judicial customs crystallized
into law, as to the sufficiency of proof of certain fact-groups to
enable the party proving them to rest upon his proof and avoid an
adverse ruling on the issue by the judge.
(b) If the party proving them would, upon resting, and upon the
adversary's offerinig no evidence, be entitled to go to the jury on the
question of whether the fact in issue is to be inferred, the presumption is permissive.
(c) If he would be entitled to a ruling by the judge directing the
jury (either absolutely or conditioned upon their believing his evidence) to find in his favor, the presumption is mandatory.
(d) The term "prima facie evidence" is usually employed in the
sense of a permissive presumption.
" "Practical experience, however, teaches us that these shades of meaning
are not well suited to controversies in the trial courts, and that often they
bring about prejudicial error," Varser, J., in Hunt v. Eure, supra, n. 36.
"Hunt v. Eure, supra, n. 36.
""In the language now suggested as a substitute it is more than doubtful
if the average juror could understand any difference between that and what is
suggested as a more perfect language that could be used," Clark, J., dissenting
in Austin v. Ry. Co., supra, n. 36.
See Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 2498.
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(e) Where proof of facts raising a mandatory presumption are
met only by evidence negativing those facts, and not by evidence of
new circumstances calling for a conflicting inference, it is necessary,
to give effect to the presumption, for the court to instruct the jury
that the presumption exists and that if they believe the evidence
adduced by the party in whose favor the presumption works, they
must find the truth of the fact presumed.
(f) The same result follows in some states (including North
Carolina) where there is no contrary evidence, but the party claiming
the benefit of the presumption has the burden of persuasion of the
fact to be presumed.
(gy If the presumption be merely permissive, or if though originally mandatory it has been met by evidence of new circumstances
raising conflicting inferences, the trial judge in submitting the issue
to the jury should have a wide discretion to advise or refrain from
advising the jury of the existence of the presumption as a rule of
law permitting them to draw the particular inference from the particular facts.
(h) The effect of presumptions in enabling a party to claim a
favorable or to escape an adverse peremptory ruling is called a shifting of the "burden of evidence," otherwise known as the "burden of
proceeding" or "duty of going forward with the evidence."
(i) A distinguishable duty is that (borne usually by the party
who first pleads on the issue) of ultimately convincing the trier of
fact (judge or jury) of the truth of a proposition of fact. The
party who has this burden will lose if the trier ends in a state of
doubt on the issue. It may be called the "burden of persuasion."
(j) The term "burden of proof" was formerly a collective one
meaning sometimes "burden of proceeding," sometimes "burden of
persuasion," and sometimes both. It is now more usually used in
the sense of "burden of persuasion."
(k) The burden of persuasion upon a contention of fact is cast
normally upon the person upon whom was cast the burden of pleading the fact, and, apart from exceptional instances, this burden of
persuasion does not shift during the trial.
(1) Hence, in most jurisdictions (including North Carolina) it
is regarded as erroneous to instruct the jury that a presumption
"shifts the burden of proof" whenever from the context that would
be understood as meaning the burden of persuasion, but it is submitted that reversals for such errors in misplacing the burden of
persuasion are rarely justified.

